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The Transfiguration of Samuel Chase: A Rebuttal 
Raoul Berger 
Professor Stephen Presser's attempt to rehabilitate Justice 
Samuel Chase and his portrayal of Thomas Jefferson as a 
"demagogue" who had scant regard for the rule of law1 led me 
t o  dissent.' Since the appearance of my response, Presser has 
published a book3 elaborating his thesis and, thereafter, a 
reply to  my di~sent .~ His valiant efforts are worthy of a better 
cause. In a brilliant study, The Limitations of Science, the 
mathematician-physicist J.W.N. Sullivan observed, "The 
rigorous criticism, the complete lack of indulgence, that is 
shown by the scientific world, is one of its most agreeable 
characteristics. Its one simple but devastating criterion [is], 'Is 
it true? . . . .'" To the extent that legal scholarship would 
approach s ~ i e n t ~ c  integrity, that must be our criterion, even 
though, to quote Thomas Huxley, "[tlhe great tragedy of science 
[is] the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact.'% 
1. Stephen B. Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The English, the 
Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 106 (1989). 
2. Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v. Thomas Jefferson: A Response to 
Stephen Presser, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 873. 
3. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: 'hI3 ENGLISH, THE 
AMERICANS, AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE (1991). 
4. Stephen B. Presser, Et tu Raoul? or The Original Misunderstanding 
Misunderstood, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1475. I do not stand in the relation of Brutus 
to Caesar. John Henry Newman wrote that "he loved . . . Truth better than dear 
friends." J.H. CARDINAL NEWMAN, APOLOGIA PRO V r r ~  SUA 110 (1989). 
Lord Aman, former vice-chancellor of the University of London, observed that 
"[p]ublication is all imperative: as a scholar you must expose yourself to criticism." 
Noel h a n ,  Hint: It's More Than One Idea, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 9 (Book 
Review), at 12. 
5. J.W.N. SULLIVAN, THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE 277-78 (1933). Andrei 
Sakharov said, " 'Profound thoughts arise only in debate, with a possibility of 
counterargument.' " William Safire, One Good Man, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1989, at 
A19. 
6. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 266, para. 19 (2d ed. 1955). 
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Writing of the "epidemic of Francophilia"' which swept the 
country in the wake of the French Revolution, Presser notes 
that Chase's fear that anarchy might spread to our shores may 
in retrospect seem "fantastic and paradoid."' Viewed even in 
his own times, it  was not his function as a judge to halt the 
tide.g Presser emphasizes that Chase sought to infuse his 
profound religious convictions into the law.'' They did not, 
however, deter him from cornering the Baltimore flour market 
in 1778 on inside information that Congress was seeking flour 
for the troops in New England." Hamilton branded him as  
" 'abandoned as any [public character] the history of past or 
present times can produce.' "I2 More reprehensible was 
Chase's conduct on the bench. But Presser thinks it "wrong of 
Berger, and virtually every other American legal historian, to 
dismiss Chase as simply a bigoted Federal bully,"13 an 
"American Jeffreys,"14 who was "almost universally described 
as  'grossly partisan,' "I5 and, as Presser notes, became "the 
hated symbol of parti~anship."'~ Are all historians out of step 
7. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  75. 
8. Id. at  180. 
9. Goebel observed that the hegemony of Parliament drastically shrank a 
court's discretion "to indulge its own ideas of policy," a view that travelled to 
America. JULIUS GOEBEL JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1971). James Wilson, for example, "anticipated no adventurous 
pronouncements on policy by the bench." Id. 
Judge Richard Peters, who sat with Chase, eschewed involvement in French 
issues, considering that such issues "should be left to the executive branch." 
PRESSER, supra note 3, at  60. 
10. Presser, supra note 4, at  1483-89; see infra text accompanying notes 68-71. 
11. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  25. Presser refers to Chase's "monstrously self- 
serving pecuniary adventures." Id. at  181. The idea "that a judge who is corrupt 
and debauched in private life may be pure and upright in his judgment," wrote 
Thomas Cooley, is "false to human nature," and "a contradiction to general 
experience." THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATTVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN 
UNION 440 (1868). 
12. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 25 (quoting 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 580 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds. 1961)). Writing about 
Chase's appointment to the Court, John Adams said, "his Character has a Mist 
about it of suspicion and Impurity . . . . He has been a warm Party Man." Id. at  
195 11.16 (quoting 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1789-1800, at 835 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1985). 
13. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1476. 
14. Id. at  1478. Tradition "has made the name of 'Judge Jeffreys' a byword of 
infamy." 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 994 (14th ed. 1929). 
15. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 21 (quoting JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST 
ERA 1789-1801, at 235 (1960)). 
16. Id. at  27. His flaws, says Presser, were most "grievous." Id. at  213 n.45. 
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but Presser? In a similar context Justice Frankfurter rejected 
the notion that the Court may say "everybody on the Court has 
been wrong for 150 years."" Presser has therefore undertaken 
a sisyphean task. 
My critique of Chase's conduct in the Callender trial18 is 
dismissed by Presser because the defense engaged in "a 
calculated attempt . . . to embarrass Chase and the Adams 
administrati~n."'~ Let that be assumed, and it does not justify 
Chase's prejudicial conduct.20 What counts is that Callender 
was denied a fair trial in violation of due process, for a "fair 
trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due proces~.'~' 
Chase constituted an unfair tribunal; in the words of Edward 
Corwin, he came to the case with the "evident disposition to 
play the 'hanging judge.' "22 Before demonstrating that Chase 
had prejudged the case, let me brush in some background. , 
A. The Alien and Sedition Acts 
Callender was charged with violation of the Sedition Act of 
1798 for contemptuous utterances about President John Ad- 
a m ~ . ~ ~  Presser notes that the Acts were "ill-conceivec and 
17. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 192-93 (1958) (concurring opinion). 
18. Berger, supra note 2, a t  879-82. 
19. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1480-81. 
20. Even published strictures should not, Justice Holmes declared, prevent a 
judge from "performing his sworn duty", e.g., to be impartial. Toledo Newspaper 
Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 424 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
21. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). 
22. Edward S. Corwin, Samuel Chase, in 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
BIOGRAPHY 36 (Allen Johnson & Dumas Malone eds., 1930). This "he is still 
commonly made out to be in the work of virtually all late twentieth century legal 
and constitutional historians." PRESSER, supra note 3, at  13. Charles Warren refers 
to Chase's "prejudiced and passionate conduct of the trials of two Republicans, 
Thomas Cooper and James T. Callender." 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 273 (1924). 
23. SAUL K. PADOVER, JEFFERSON 110 (Mentor abr. ed. 1952). Chase explained 
that Callender's offense was "to assert that Adams, as a professed aristocrat, was 
an enemy to the republican government." PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  135. 
Jefferson too "was made the target of such abuse and defamation as  was never 
before heaped upon any public figure in America. The Federalists portrayed him as 
a thief, a coward, a libertine, an infidel, and an atheist." PADOVER, supra, at  116. 
But his administration did not turn to the courts; "No matter how greatly the 
newspapers abused their freedom, Jefferson felt, it was vital for democracy that 
freedom not be checked." Id. at  143. See also ALBERT J. NOCK, JEFFERSON 236-38 
(1926). 
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that "more and more [the Federalists] were perceived by the 
American voting public as the party of brutish reaction and 
pampered aristocra~y."~~ The "usual American scholars' opin- 
ion of these Acts and the period of their implementation is that 
they reflected a 'reign of terror' " by the  federalist^.'^ The an- 
tecedent English opposition thinkers "had correctly realized 
that the English law of seditious libel was a profound impedi- 
ment to the statement of their political views."26 In his biogra- 
phy of Jefferson, Saul Padover considers that the "Federalists 
were out t o  destroy republicanism, Jeffer~onianism."~' Such 
statements are dismissed by Presser as "opinions of mostly 
twentieth century historians (who relied principally on Jefferso- 
nian pr~paganda),"'~ postulating that Samuel Eliot Morison, 
Dumas Malone, and Justice Frankfurter had the wool pulled 
over their eyes." Consider two Federalist appraisals free of 
Jeffersonian virus: Marshall viewed the Sedition Act as 
"useless and unwise";30 Hamilton "feared the effect of the re- 
pressive legislation. 'Let us not establish a tyranny.' "31 
"For many years in America there had been a fear of judi- 
cial discretion," and provision for tenure "rekindled some of 
those old fears about judicial arbitrarines~."~ Federalists re- 
sponded to this fear "by asserting that the judicial function . . . 
would simply be one of lawfinding, and not law making."33 
Where did the Constitution authorize judges "to restrain the 
24. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 3. 
26. Id. at 118. Presser rejects the "reign of terror" because the Federalists' 
"feeble effortsw-fines of a "few thousand dollars, and no more than a few months 
in prisonw-hardly compares with the "same fear of treason [that] caused Hungari- 
ans to  put to death a man who translated the Marseillaise . . . into Magyar. Simi- 
larly, the governments of Austria, Rumania [sic], and Russia, during this period, 
regularly meted out to dissidents sentences of death, sixty years in chains . . . ." 
Id. at 119. But they fled to America in order to  escape such enormities. "It could 
have been worse" is a small extenuation. 
26. Id. at 93. 
27. PADOVER, supra note 23, at 108. 
28. Presser, supra note 4, at 1480 (citing Berger, supra note 2, at 880). The 
Federalist fear of democracy is exemplified by Gouverneur Morris's statement in 
the Senate: " 'Why are we here? . . . To save the people from their greatest ene- 
my; to  save them from themselves.' " MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON 
AND THE NEW NATION 697 (1970). 
29. See i n h  text accompanying notes 36-41. 
30. PADOVER, supra note 23, at 109. 
31. Id. 
32. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 29. 
33. Id. 
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dangerous majoritarian trends in some of the states"?34 The 
English Puritans, whose views travelled to America, feared the 
"judges' imposition of their personal views."35 
Chase, an "ardent Federali~t,"~~ agitated for passage of 
the Act "and then threw himself into the forefront of Federalist 
judges who pushed hard for enf~rcement,"~' thereby, wrote 
Samuel Eliot Morison, "confound[ing] political opposition with 
sedition.'"' The Federalist judiciary, Dumas Malone conclud- 
ed, "amounted to an arm of that party,"3g and its object "was 
the silencing of the opposition press."40 Thus, as Felix Frank- 
furter observed, "[tlhe judicial system was drawn into the vor- 
tex of politi~s."~' In his State Trials, Francis Wharton stated 
34. Id. 
35. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885, 891 (1985). The Tory Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachu- 
setts said that if "the Will of the Judge would be the Law . . . this tends to a 
State of Slavery." Morton J. Horowitz, The Emergence of an  Instrumental Concep- 
tion of American Law, 1780-1820, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 287, 
321 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971). 
36. Alexander P. Humphrey, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase, 33 AM. L. 
REV. 827, 836 (1899). Presser notes "Chase's zealous campaigning for Adams." 
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 161. And he finds Chase's campaigning "more perplexing 
really than his conduct in the Fries, Cooper, and Callender trials." Id. at 141. 
Judges, said Hamilton, were to be independent to guard against "those ill humors, 
which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures some- 
times disseminate among the people themselves." = FEDERALIST NO. 78, a t  494 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961). Judges were not to stir up  
such "humors." In the Federal Convention, James Wilson explained that judicial 
independence was designed to remove judges from "every gust of faction." 2 RE- 
CORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, a t  429 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter RECORDS]. 
Nor did Chase limit himself to the hustings. His "principal jeremiad" was his 
now infamous charge to a Baltimore grand jury, criticizing the extension of suf- 
frage. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  39. According to Presser, Chase engaged in dan- 
gerous moves to control Jeffersonian influence on popular institutions like the jury, 
and to criticize universal suffrage, since it would lead to a dernogogically inspired 
"mobocracy." Id. a t  149. Chase conceived that "it was the judiciary's job to restrain 
democratic tendencies in the populace . . . ." Id. a t  148. See also CLAUDE G. BOW- 
ERS, JEFFERSON IN POWER 273-74 (1936). 
Presser explains that Chase was convinced that he could "apply a jurisprudence 
which was above faction" because i t  rested on "the one true constitutional faith." 
Presser, supra note 4, a t  1483. The fact remains that he was the "most fanatical 
Federalist on the bench." PETERSON, supra note 28, a t  635. 
37. Irving Dilliard, Samuel Chase, in 1 JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SU- 
PREME COURT 185, 194 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969). 
38. SAMUEL E. MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 353 
(1965). 
39. 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIMES 458 (1970). 
40. Id. at 466. 
41. FELIX FRANKFWRTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
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that the Sedition Act "was pressed by Judge Chase with inquis- 
itorial energy, and executed with intolerant ~ igour . "~~  Under- 
standably the Jeffersonians "came to regard the courts as a 
political adjunct of the hated  federalist^.'"^ It did not require 
misrepresentation by defense counsel to 'excite public indigna- 
tion against the court and the go~ernment.'"~ Presser recog- 
nizes that the Federalists were swept from office in 1800 be- 
cause of their "zealous prosecution of seditious libel and the 
other blatant examples of transplanted English. . . jurispru- 
dence employed by. . . Chase in the Fries and Callender cas- 
e~ . ' "~  Although the Act was not directly tested in the Supreme 
Court, it declared in 1964 that "the attack upon its validity has 
carried the day in the court of hi~tory.'"~ 
B. The Trial 
Now for the facts that prove the gross partiality of the 
"hanging judge." Luther Martin, Chase's chief counsel in the 
subsequent impeachment proceedings, testified therein that he 
had obtained Callender's book; underscored "a great portion of 
the book"; thought it "ought to be prosecuted"; and, learning 
that Chase was to sit on circuit in Richmond, gave it to him? 
A respected lawyer, John Mason, testified that Chase told him 
that if Virginia would "furnish a jury of good and respectable 
men, he would certainly punish Callender," and thereby teach 
the people "to distinguish between liberty and licentiousness of 
the press.'"' Chase admitted that "the atrocious and profligate 
libel" had "excited" his "indignation," and that he feared lest an 
"atrocious offender" would escape p~nishrnent.~~ To James 
COURT 21 (1927). 
42.  RANCI CIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 45 (1849). 
43. 4 MALONE, supra note 39, at  21. 
44. Presser, supra note 4, at 1481 11.22 (citing 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE 
LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 203 (1919) (quoting Luther Martin's argument at  the 
Chase impeachment trial)). Albert Beveridge, no Jeffersonian, wrote that the "man- 
ners and methods [of the nationalist judges] in the enforcement of the Sedition Act 
aroused against them an ever increasing hostility. . . . Finally the very name and 
sight of National judges became obnoxious to most Americans. In short, the as- 
saults upon the National Judiciary were made possible chiefly by the conduct of 
the National judges themselves." 3 BEVERIDGE, supra, at 29-30. 
45. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  94. 
46. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
47. 14 ANNAIS OF CONG. 24546 (1852). PRESSER, supra note 3, at  232 n.9. 
48. 14 ANNAB OF CONG. 216-17 (1852). 
49. Id. at 135-36. 
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Triplett, he remarked, "it is a pity you have not hanged the 
rascal."50 Can it be doubted that Chase had prejudged the 
case and was not an impartial judge? Presser answers that 
"our contemporary ideas about judicial objectivity cannot serve 
as useful standards for evaluating the jurisprudence of the late 
eighteenth century."51 Hamilton, who reflected "late eigh- 
teenth century" standards, declared, "[wlho would be willing to  
stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury acting 
under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his 
guilt?"' Blackstone stated that the "tyrannical partiality of 
judges" was a "crime of deep malignity."53 
Throughout the trial Chase exhibited his partiality. Albert 
Beveridge, not infected with Jeffersonianism, noted the "sarcas- 
tic contempt" with which Chase treated defense counsel and 
noted that Chase's frequent interruptions were "extremely well 
calculated to abash and disconcert counsel."54 Marshall, an 
attendant at the trial, later testified that Chase plainly exhibit- 
ed "disgust" with the way counsel was conducting the de- 
fense.s5 Presser himself notices Chase's "extraordinary conde- 
scension" to defense counsel "and his pointed humor at their 
-expense,"56 the more damaging because, as Chase frequently 
stressed, they were only "young gentlemen."57 In his impeach- 
ment trial, Chase acknowledged that "vexatious interruptions 
of counsel'' and "manifestations of 'indecent solicitude' for the 
conviction of a most notorious offender" are "no doubt improper 
50. Id. at 217-18. 
51. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  174. But Presser does not shrink, after 
Jefferson's alleged "approval of extra-legal means of apprehending Burr," to pre- 
sume that Jefferson was "pronouncing his guilt before benefit of trial." Presser, 
supra note 4, at  1491; see infia note 95. 
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, a t  429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright 
ed., 1961). THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 80 (Everyman's Library 1943) (165 1) ("[Ilf 
a man be trusted to judge, between man and man, it is a precept of the law of 
nature, that he deal equally between them."). 
53. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 
(1769). 
54. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 44, at  190. 
55. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 537 (1852). 
56. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  134. Chief Justice Rehnquist observes that there 
is an "obligation upon the judge to refrain from ridiculing or making light of the 
lawyers." WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 84 (1992). 
57. When "young gentlemen" comes from the mouth of a Justice three times in 
as many minutes, WHARTON, supra note 42, at 8, it is manifestly belittling, de- 
signed to suggest to the jury that defendant's counsel are still immature, in judg- 
ment as well as in years. 
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and unbecoming in a judge" but were not defined as a crime.58 
Even so, they deprived Callender of the impartial trial guar- 
anteed by due process. 
Such behavior was designed to prejudice the jury, who 
identify defense counsel with the defendant. At length, defense 
counsel threw up their briefs. For Presser, this was merely part 
of their campaign to  discredit Chase and Adamd9 But Henry 
Adams, scarcely influenced by "Jeffersonian propaganda," said 
in his History of the United States that Chase's "overbearing 
manner had twice driven from his court the most eminent 
counsel of the ~ircuit."~' Against this, Presser quotes Albert 
Beveridge's quotation of Luther Martin's statement at the 
Chase impeachment trial that Callender's lawyers sought " 'to 
hold up the prosecution as oppressive' in order to  'excite public 
indignation against the court.' "'l A statement by a lawyer for 
a client condemning the conduct of opposing counsel gains 
nothing by being quoted by Albert Beveridge. Indeed, why 
should evaluations by disinterested scholars like Frankf'ter 
and Morison be kissed off as tinctured by "Jeffersonian propa- 
ganda" whilst the testimony of Chase's attorney is regarded as 
gospel truth? Martin's statement needs to  be juxtaposed with 
his later remarks. In 1810, he appeared before Chase on circuit 
in Baltimore, somewhat more inebriated than usual. When 
Chase said to him, "I am surprised that you can so prostitute 
your talents," Martin replied, "Sir, I never prostituted my tal- 
ents except when I defended you and Colonel Burr," and turn- 
ing to the jury, he added codidentially, "a couple of the great- 
est rascals in the In vino veritas. 
Merrill Peterson concluded that the Callender trial was a 
"travesty of justice."63 Nevertheless, Presser maintains that 
because of the "machinations of Callender's defense counsel," 
58. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 157. 
59. Id. at 134. 
60. 2 HENRY ADAMS, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 147-48 
(1962). 
61. Presser, supra note 4, at 1481 11.22. Martin was Chase's chief counsel in 
the impeachment hearings. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
62. PAUL S. CLARKSON & R. SAMUEL J m ,  LUTHER MARTIN OF MARYLAND 280 
(1970). 
63. PETERSON, supra note 28, at 635. Claude Bowers wrote, "No one with an 
elementary sense of common decency can read in Wharton's 'State Trials' the out- 
rageous miscarriages of justice with feelings other than those of loathing and dis- 
gust." BOWERS, supra note 36, at 269. 
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the "trial itself was stacked against Cha~e,'"~ a man, Presser 
notes, still commonly regarded as a "'rabid partisan', a court- 
room bully who wrongfully used the bench as a 'political 
stump."'65 This, Presser considers, is the view of "those who 
ought t o  know better,"66 preferring the "more astute histori- 
ans" who regard Chase as "conciliatory," and "di~interested."~~ 
Measured by the record, such "astuteness" is laughable. 
C. Adjudication and Re1 &ion 
That Chase was hag-ridden by his drive to enforce the 
Sedition Act is hardly deniable. To my statement that Chase's 
" 'religiously inspired' convictions did nbt excuse his judicial 
partisanship. So was the Inq~isition,"~~ Presser retorts that 
this is "dubious history, and maybe even dubious  manner^.'"^ 
Since when is a statement of an undeniable fact-the Inquisi- 
tion also was religiously inspired-a breach of scholarly man- 
ners? Certainly it is not "dubious history." The Inquisition 
punished heretics, those who departed from Catholic ortho- 
doxy.?' Presser's defense of Chase nicely f i t s  into this pattern: 
"Chase's religion, and the moral basis for his jurisprudence 
which religion furnished him, convinced him . . . that [he] could 
apply a jurisprudence which was above faction . . . the one true 
constitutional faith."71 People were burned at the stake for 
departures from the "one true faith"-Galileo was forced to 
recant his view that the earth revolved around the sun for 
precisely such a departure. Presser explains Chase's passionate 
enforcement of the Sedition Act, but he fails to  absolve him 
from prejudicial partiality. It is of no avail that Chase could 
"convince himself that he was not a partisan."72 How could he 
be if there was but one true faith and if those who differed 
were guilty of "partisan, popular ex~esses"?'~ Chase confused 
his own prejudices with Holy Writ, and this at a time when 
64. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 133 (emphasis added). 
65. Id. at 8. Presser acknowledges that Chase had some "tragic," "grievous" 
flaws. Id. at 234 11.45. 
66. Id. at 8. 
67. Id. at 19. 
68. Berger, supra note 2, at 885. 
69. Presser, supra note 4, at 1483. 
70. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 377 (14th ed. 1929). 
71. Presser, supra note 4, at 1483. 
72. Id. at 1484. 
73. Id. 
568 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
American opinion was moving towards the conception that "it 
was the job of the law to liberate the individual from the moral 
dictates of the ~ommuni ty ,"~~ let alone from those of an over- 
bearing judge. 
11. THE TRIAL OF JOHN FRIES 
A. Fries' Rebellion in Eastern Pennsylvania 
John Fries, himself a Federalist,?' was prosecuted for 
treason and sentenced to death for leading an armed "rebellion" 
in  Pennsylvania. Presser dismisses my criticism because it 
relies on "a general secondary source, which utterly distorts the 
facts of the Eastern Pennsylvania rebellion . . . and which un- 
doubtedly relies on spurious Jeffersonian  account^."?^ This 
impressionable "secondary source," Samuel Eliot Morison, 
wrote that when federal assessors arrived in Bucks County to 
survey real estate for a direct tax, "they were attacked by irate 
housewives with broomsticks and boiling water, and .  . . Fries 
put himself a t  the head of the rabble which drummed the offi- 
cial out of the county."77 
Initially, Presser was very much of the same mind: "The 
insurgency involved much display of armed might by the insur- 
gents, much marching around and saber-rattling, and an armed 
attack on a federal marshal that resulted in the forced libera- 
tion of some federal prisoners whom the marshal had in his 
custody."78 He notes that "[ilt seems to be the currently ac- 
cepted wisdom of American historians that Federalist conduct 
in suppressing [the rebellion] did go too f a r .  . . . The Fries 
rebellion is habitually dismissed by modern American histori- 
74. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  175-76. 
75. PETERSON, supra note 28, at 622. 
76. Presser, supra note 4, at 1481. The evidence, states Presser, "appears to 
have all but disappeared." PRESSER, supra note 3, at 31. Therefore he relies on 
long-hand annotations on newspaper clippings written in 1860 by Jacob Rice, from 
which Presser deduces that "Rice appears to have some firsthand knowledge of the 
Fries Rebellion." Id. at 32 (emphasis added). Since the rebellion took place in 1799, 
Rice must have been a nine-year-old observer, scarcely the sort of "firsthand" 
knowledge to explode the "accepted wisdom of American historians." They too had 
access to the newspaper clippings. See also id. a t  226 n.20. 
77. MORISON, supra note 38, a t  355. 
78. Presser, supra note 1, a t  131. Jefferson wrote to Abigail Adams, "I like a 
little rebellion now and then . . . . The spirit of resistance to government is so 
valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always kept alive." NOCK, supra 
note 23, a t  116. 
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ans as a minor incident."?' Now Presser takes a grimmer 
view: "The rebellion was a serious uprising of thousands of 
armed insurgents bent on taking the law into their own 
hands.'"' "Although there was no real bloodshed," he observes, 
"there was . . . much marching around by armed troops in uni- 
form and at least one overt act of rebellion-the liberation of 
prisoners from the custody of a federal marshal by means of 
armed militia? Did this amount to "treason" or 'levying 
war" against the United States? 
Apparently Presser relies on the English rule, adopted by 
the Court in the Whiskey Rebellion case, of ''constructive levy- 
ing of war" by "armed opposition to execution of a United 
States statute."82 But Article 111, Section 3 of the Constitution 
declares that "[tlreason against the United States shall consist 
only in levying war against them."83 "Only" was not inadver- 
tent. Aware, in the words of James Wilson, that "numerous and 
dangerous excrescences" had disfigured the English law of 
treason, the Framers delimited treason and thereby, as Wilson 
assured the Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, put it be- 
yond the power of Congress to "extend the crime and punish- 
ment of treason."84 "Only" levying war was treasonable; "con- 
structive" levying of war constituted the very "extension" of the 
crime that the Framers plainly meant to prevent? 
B. The Aaron Burr Conspiracy 
Presser's treatment of Fries is in marked contrast to his 
indulgent portrayal of the Aaron Burr conspiracy. Burr set 
afoot an extensive, planned conspiracy, into which he sought to  
draw England and Spain and t o  "make Louisiana an indepen- 
dent republic, which Mississippi Territory would surely decide 
79. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  31. 
80. Presser, supra note 4, at  1481. But see REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 48 
("Fries's Rebellion does not seem to have been a great threat to the nation . . . . 
No shots were fwed, there were no injuries, and the crowd soon dispersed."). 
81. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  104. 
82. Id. at  102 (emphasis added). 
83. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
84. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 663 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967). See 
also 2 DERATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITZJTION 469 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836). 
85. Blackstone adverts to the "great latitude left in the breast of the judges, to 
determine what was treason, or not so: whereby the creatures of t y r a ~ i c a l  princes 
had opportunity to create abundance of constructive treasons." 4 BLACKSTONE, su- 
pra note 53, at 75. 
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to join."86 Burr and Blennerhasset, "commanding an advance 
guard [ofl . . . flatboats, had reached the mouth of the 
Cumberland River" when co-conspirator General Wilkinson 
betrayed Burr's conspiracy "to dismember the Union."" Burr 
was acquitted by Marshall on the ground that "the mere gath- 
ering of forces with intent to promote secession was not treason 
if the expedition collap~ed."~~ Certainly, the threat by Fries' 
"rabble" was less ominous than the planned gathering of Burr's 
forces. Morison concluded that Burr was engaged in "the most 
formidable secession conspiracy prior to 1860."89 Against 
Morison, a renowned historian, Presser counters with the view 
of a novelist, Gore Vidal, that Burr was "railroaded" by the 
Jeffersonian~.~~ 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "railroaded" as  "to 
rush (a person or thing) to or into a place, through a pro- 
ce~s."~'  Peterson remarks on Jefferson's "first hesitant steps to 
cope with the conspiracy, a conspiracy so strangely public by 
then that men wondered at the timidity of the go~ernment . "~~ 
Henry Adams "bitterly . . . arraign[ed] Jefferson for inexcusable 
lassitude and indifference in failing to strike months before he 
did."93 When Jefferson did act, "[ilt was wrung from him by a 
resolution in the House, pressed by his most virulent enemy, 
John R a n d ~ l p h . ~ ~  All of which is incompatible with "railroad- 
i ~ ~ g . ' " ~  
86. MORISON, supra note 38, at 369. 
87. Id. at  370. For detailed accounts of the Burr conspiracy, see BOWERS, supra 
note 36, at  366-426; PETERSON, supra note 28, at 841-54. 
88. MORISON, supra note 38, at 370. But Marshall, who presided, also stated 
that "the evidence was sufficient to hold Burr to answer on a charge of organizing 
an expedition against Spainn-a misdemeanor. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 118. 
So here was a criminal conspiracy. Compare infia text accompanying note 96. 
89. MORISON, supra note 38, at 370. 
90. Presser, supra note 4, at  1491 11.84. 
91. 8 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 114 (1969). 
92. PETERSON, supra note 28, at 847. 
93. BOWERS, supra note 36, at 398. 
94. Id. 
95. Presser disposes of the Burr conspiracy-"if there was one," see infia text 
accompanying note 96, by reference to Jefferson's alleged "approval of extra-legal 
means of apprehending Burr (and, presumably pronouncing his guilt before benefit 
of trial)." Presser, supra note 4, at 1491. Apprehension of one who twice had fled 
the jurisdiction, see PETERSON, supra note 28, at 853, does not amount to a pro- 
nouncement of guilt. Presser cites to Berger, supra note 2, at 896-98, which merely 
quotes his own statement that Jefferson excused his "failure to observe the niceties 
of federal law in prosecuting his arch-enemy Aaron Burr." My article then proceeds 
to refute Presser's construction of Jefferson's action. One who read's Peterson's 
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"We now know," Presser  asser t s ,  " tha t  Burr's 
conspiracy-if there was one-was not the danger Jefferson 
claimed i t  was."96 But it bore a quite different aspect to con- 
temporaries. After investigating the participation of Senator 
John Smith of Ohio, a Senate Committee, chaired by Senator 
John Quincy Adams, "warmly commended the administration 
for suppressing the conspiracy that would, 'in a very short 
lapse of time, have terminated not only in war, but in a war of 
the most horrible des~ription.'"~' Justly did the Committee 
obliquely attribute the acquittal to the "curtain of artificial 
rules" invoked by MarshalLg8 The high-minded Adams was 
not one to lend himself to a white-wash of Jefferson. Whatever 
the merits, Marshall's strict construction of applicable stan- 
dardssg is at a long remove from Chase's easy invocation of 
treason in the Fries case. "Sabre-rattling" was not likely to 
result in "a war of the most horrible description." 
C. The Trial of John Fries 
To recur to the Fries trial, Presser has yet other objections 
to my critique of Chase's conduct. In the first trial before Judge 
Richard Peters, Fries' renowned lawyers, Alexander Dallas and 
William Lewis, were permitted to argue a t  length that treason 
under American law differed from that of England.loO When 
Peters declared a mistrial because one juror had prejudged the 
case,lO' it was retried before Chase, who barred such argu- 
ment.lo2 Presser considers that this was "clearly good law in 
extensive account of the conspiracy will appreciate Jefferson's forbearance in deal- 
ing with a deep-dyed villain. PETERSON, supra note 28, a t  841-54. 
96. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1491 (emphasis added). 
97. PETERSON, supra note 28, at  873. 
98. Id. 
99. Corwin, who was "antipathetic to Jefferson, and generally sympathetic to- 
ward Marshall, has concluded that 'Marshall's conduct of Burr's trial is the one 
serious blemish on his judicial record.' " BOWERS, supra note 36, a t  423 (quoting 3 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE CONSTITUTION 2 (1919)). Marshall, it 
is to be borne in mind, was a bitter enemy of Jefferson. 2 PAGE SMITH, JOHN 
ADAMS 1064 (1962). 
100. Presser, supra note 1, a t  131. 
101. Id. 
102. Presser, supra note 4, at  1482. Chase had drafted an opinion on the appli- 
cable law before trial, which was concededly unprecedented, and which he delivered 
to defense counsel, who then withdrew from the case "since the court had pre- 
judged what they wished to argue." PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  110. Presser consid- 
ers that their "real motive" was to present Chase as "a harsh and cruel judge" in 
order to create "sympathy for Fries." Id. at  112. Julius Goebel was closer to the 
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England, and probably in America as  well."'" "Clearly" it 
was not. During the debates on passage of Fox's Libel Bill in 
1791, Lord Loughborough, who had served as Chief Justice of 
Common Pleas, said that the "bill was a declaratory bill . . . to 
declare and explain what was understood to be . . . the law of 
the land."lM Presser maintains, however, that the Fox Act 
pertains only to seditious libel;'" but Charles James Fox 
stated in course of the enactment debate that "it was the prac- 
tice of the jury to judge of law and factyy with respect to "every 
other criminal indi~trnent."'~~ Nevertheless, Presser insists 
that the Fox Act required the "deferential jury [to] make its 
determination under the direction of the court."107 How is this 
to be reconciled with Chase's understanding that "in criminal 
cases nothing could prevent the jury from applying whatever 
law it  saw fity'?'" Lord Loughborough stated that "as Chief 
Justice he had ever deemed it his duty, in cases of libel, to 
state the law as it bore on the facts, and to refer the combined 
considerations to the jury," whose "decision was final."log So 
too, Lord Camden, likewise a former Chief Justice of Common 
Pleas, said that "[tlhe judge should interpose nothing but his 
advice; if he attempted to control them, there was an  end to 
trial by j~ ry . " "~  Earlier, Blackstone obsemed, "If the judge's 
opinion must rule the verdict, the trial by jury would be use- 
less.""' Manifestly, Presser's reading of the Fox Libel Act as 
"preserving the essential premise that the jury was obligated to 
mark in viewing the withdrawal "to maintain the honor of the bar." Id. Eminent 
counsel would not gamble with the life of a man accused of treason in order to 
arouse popular sympathy. See also supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
103. Presser, supra note 4, at  1482. 
104. 29 PmL. HIST. ENG. 731 (1817). Lord Camden said the purpose of the bill 
was not to 'alter the law, but merely to remove doubts that ought never to have 
been entertained." Id. at 732. For a more detailed discussion, see Raoul Berger, 
The Jury's Role in Capital Cases Is Immune from Judicial Interference, 1990 B.Y.U. 
L. REV. 639. 
105. Presser, supra note 4, at  1487. 
106. 29 PARL. HIST. ENG. 564, 597 (1817). 
107. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  93. 
108. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1488. 
109. 29 PARL. HIST. ENG. 1296-97 (1817). 
110. Id. at  731. In 1771, John Adams asked, '[Ils it not an absurdity to suppose 
that the law would oblige them to find a verdict according to the direction of the 
court, against their own opinion, judgment and conscience?" 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS 253-55 (Charles F. Adams comp., 1855). 
111. PRESSER, supm note 3, a t  209 11.15 (quoting 4 BLACRSTONE, supra note 53, 
at  343, 354-55). 
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follow the law as laid down by the judge"'" is at war with 
the drafters' explanation. 
Some references to similar early American practice are 
cited in my earlier In the colonial scheme, Shannon 
Stirnson recently wrote that ''juries held the central place in 
colonial courts"; colonials considered that " 'juries rather than 
judges spoke the last word on law enforcement.' "'I4 William 
- Nelson observed that the jury's power "to 'find law' was almost 
~nlimited."''~ Presser himself refers to "the truism that the 
American jury was to be the judge of both fact and law."l16 
Indeed, this was the view of Chase; in his pre-trial opinion, he 
stated, "It is the duty of the court in this, and in all criminal 
cases, to  state to the jury, their opinion of the law arising on all 
the facts; but the jury are to decide . . . both the law and the 
facts . . . ."'17 So pronounced was this attachment to jury fi- 
nality as to both law and fact that, as Presser observes, Feder- 
alist attempts "to curtail the discretion of the criminal jury" 
were "a major cause of the fall from political grace of the Fed- 
eralists."'" Albeit, Fries posed an issue of "constitutional 
law"-at a time when the very conception of "constitutional 
law" was aborning-it was "law" nonetheless, and defense 
counsel could logically claim under accepted tenets that the 
jury had a right to pass on it. Indeed, Presser notes that in Van 
Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, lg Justice "Paterson was appar- 
ently prepared to give the jury this power even where great 
constitutionally protected rights were at  stake and where it 
was the duty of the court to 'adhere to the Constitution and 
declare [a statute] null and void.' "I2' 
The foregoing facts run counter to Presser's contention that 
jury ascendancy violated the rule of law-the requisites of 
112. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 53. 
113. See Berger, supra note 104, at 641-42. 
114. SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE  ERICAN AN REVOLUTION I  THE LAW 48 (1990) 
(quoting William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall's 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 904 (1978)). Americans be- 
lieved that "the expansive participation by the jury in legal decisions was an 
essential safeguard to the liberty of the people. This required that the jury be 
given the latitude to pass on questions both of 'law' and 'fad.' " PRESSER, supra 
note 3, at 17. 
115. STIMSON, supra note 114, at 49. ' 
116. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 111. 
117. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 67. 
118. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 67. 
119. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (1795). 
120. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 65. 
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certainty. Doubtless certainty is a desideratum; but we may not 
impute to Camden, Loughborough, and Kent ignorance of the 
varying nature of jury verdicts. Rather, preservation of jury 
control as a bulwark against oppression loomed larger than 
absolute fealty to certainty. Then too, the rule of law was satis- 
fied by the settled "law"-that expressed by Lords Camden, 
Loughborough, and by Charles James Fox-which gave juries 
the final word. As Presser repeatedly reminds us, we may not 
substitute present views for those that prevailed a t  the time of 
the Fries trial. 12' 
Presser urges that 'Tries's [wily] counsel, seeing political 
capital to be made and believing that they could maneuver for 
a pardon of Fries, refused to go on with the trial."lP "Aston- 
ishingly," states Presszr, "Berger appears to have accepted 
uncritically the Jeffersonian fabrication that Chase drove 
Fries's counsel from the ~ a s e . " ' ~  In his History of the United 
States, Henry Adams, who cannot be charged with "uncritical" 
acceptance of "Jeffersonian fabrications,"' wrote that Chase's 
"overbearing manner had twice driven from his court the most 
eminent counsel of the ~ircui t ." '~  
Presser dwells on Chase's "extraordinary gesture" of offer- 
ing "to act both as counsel f3r the defense and as judge[]," 
though he notes that "Chase was doing no more than 'following 
common law tradition."'l* But he notes that "Chase did not 
abandon his protection of the prosecution's interests2'-in the 
presence of the prosec~tor . '~~  When the prosecutor "declined 
to sum up the evidence against Fries" because "Fries had no 
121. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
122. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1482. "Wily [and eminent] counsel" would not 
gamble with the life of a client in the hope that the Federalist President would 
pardon him. 
123. Id. 
124. 2 ADAMS, supra note 60, at  147-48. See also supra text accompanying note 
60. Rehnquist, however, mnsiders, "There is good reason to think . . . that Fries's 
attorneys withdrew at least in part to increase the chances of a presidential par- 
don for him if he were convicted." REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 89. Julius Goebel 
came to a contrary conclusion. See supm note 102. Rehnquist notes that William 
Lewis, counsel for Fries, "was a fierce guardian of the independence of the bar, 
and of the fullest right of defense on behalf of an accused criminal, so it is un- 
derstandable that he was deeply offended by Chase's manner of proceeding at the 
Fries trial." REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at  62. Lewis said, "I will never permit my 
hand to be tainted with a prejudged opinion in any case, much less in a capital 
one." Id. a t  63. 
125. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  112-13. 
126. Id. at  113. 
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counsel t o  give a countersummary, Chase announced that fair- 
ness to the government required a summing up," and unless 
the prosecutor did so, "then he, Chase, would."1z7 This is but 
one of many illustrations of Chase's allying himself with the 
prosecution, indeed of pressing beyond the prosecutor's express 
desire. 
Chase sentenced Fries to death, and President Adams 
pardoned him. According to  Presser, the pardon was procured 
by Fries's counsel "from the popularity-seeking ad am^."'^^ My 
interpretation, he opines, "seems to stretch the facts."129 The 
facts are that Thomas Adams, son of the President, told Wil- 
liam Lewis that "his father wished to know the points and 
authorities which Mr. Dallas and he [had] intended to  rely on, 
in favour of Fries, if they had defended him on the trial."lsO 
John Adams, himself a respected lawyer, had written in 1771 
that the jury "determine[d] both the fact and the law . . . . [Ils 
it not an absurdity t o  suppose that the law would oblige them 
to find a verdict according to the direction of the court, against 
their own opinions, judgment and cons~ience."~~' Dallas's at- 
tempt to argue the point of lawls2 inferably struck a sympa- 
thetic chord in Adams. The dour President was hardly a "popu- 
larity seeker." In truth, he despised "a mean itch for populari- 
ty? That he acted on the promptings of his own conscience 
is attested by the fact that almost a decade later he recalled 
the Fries pardon "with infinite satisfaction . . . which will con- 
sole me in my last hour."lS4 Such testimony transcends specu- 
lation that Adams was motivated by a drive to win reelection. 
Presser maintains that Chase was acquitted because "the 
impeachment charges had no real substance," and he chides me 
for neglecting to  address his argument that "Chase's rulings 












Presser, supra note 4, at 1482. 
Id. at 1482-83. 
WHARTON, supra note 42, at 645. 
2 ADAMS, supra note 60, at 253-55. 
See supra text accompanying notes 100-102. 
PETERSON, supra note 28, at 703. 
WHARTON, supra note 42, at 646. "Adams, to his great credit . . . pardoned 
REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 49. 
Presser, supra note 4, at 1489 (emphasis added). Charles Warren remarked 
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"rulings" were trivial, so I focused on the charge made in arti- 
cle 4, paragraph 5 of the Articles of Impeachment that Chase's 
conduct was marked by "an indecent solicitude . . . for the con- 
viction of the accused . . . highly disgraceful to the character of 
a judge, as it was subversive of justice."136 Blackstone, it will 
be recalled, stated that the "tyrannical partiality of judges" was 
a "crime of deep rnalig~~ity."'~' Chase's blatant partiality not 
only deprived Callender of the fair trial promised by the Due 
Process Clause, but it also violated a statute. By the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, a Justice was sworn to "administer justice without 
respect to persons" and "impartially discharge and perform all 
the duties incumbent upon him."ls8 Thus, Chase's incontro- 
vertible partiality violated the statute, and his denial of due 
process subverted the Constitution. Blackstone wrote that "the 
first and principal [high misdemeanor] is the mal-administra- 
tion of such high officers, as are in the public trust and em- 
ployment. This is usually punished by the method of parlia- 
mentary impeachment . . . ."lSg English judges, Justice Story 
observed, had been impeached "for acting grossly contrary to 
the duties of their office."140 Elsewhere, I have collected exam- 
ples of such impeachable offenses.141 
Presser has neglected to comment on these facts; his con- 
clusion that Berger "is still wrong" in arguing that "Chase 
should have been convicted,'"" rests on the alleged propriety 
of Chase's "rulings" during the trial. Presser's view is espoused 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his recent Grand  inquest^.'^^ 
He considers that even if Chase's rulings during the Callender 
on Chase's "arbitrary and unusual rulings" in the Fries case. 1 WARREN, supra 
note 22, a t  273. 
136. 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 86 (1852). Marshall, who testified in the impeachment 
trial, "admitted that the refusal to hear Callender's lawyers on the constitutionality 
of the Sedition Act was unusual. He admitted he had never known another in- 
stance where, as in the case of John Taylor, the question to be asked the witness 
had to be reduced to writing." BOWERS, supra note 36, at 285. Whether or not 
such rulings violated the law, they undoubtedly exhibited bias. For a compact ac- 
count of the impeachment trial see id. at 277-91. 
137. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53; see also supra text accompanying note 53. 
138. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, $ 8, 1 Stat. 76 (1789). 
139. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at  121. 
140. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES $ 800 (5th ed. 1905). 
141. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 67-68 
(1973). 
142. Presser, supra note 4, at  1489. 
143. REHNQUIST, supra note 56. 
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trial were erroneous, they were not, roughly speaking, unlaw- 
f ~ 1 . l ~ ~  But when they all run one way, against the defendant, 
when they are "arbitrary,"'45 "highly unusual,"'46 and "ex- 
traordinary,"'" they are evidence of bias. By the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, a Justice was to  be sworn to "impartially discharge 
all the duties incumbent upon [him]."'" Violation of that oath 
subverted the rule of law. Rehnquist notes Chase's "thoroughly 
partisan attitude during parts of the proceedings against John 
Callender,"14' his breach of the "obligation . . . to refrain from 
ridiculing. . . the lawyers,"150 ridicule which Chase directed 
solely against counsel for defendant and which inevitably preju- 
diced the jury. Justice Berkeley was impeached in England 
because, inter alia he "did much discourage complainant's coun- 
~ ~ 1 . ~ ~ ~ 5 ~  
What Rehnquist justly regards as "most damaging" to 
Chase were "incidents that occurred before he ever reached 
Richmond to try the case."152 These incidents-detailed in the 
testimonies of Luther Martin and John Mason before the 
Senate-are recounted above,'53 and again by Rehnquist? 
They reveal, he acknowledges, "rather clear bias of Chase 
against Callender."'55 But he remarks that they "were not re- 
ferred to in the Articles of Impea~hrnent."'~~ Let us look at  
the Articles. 
Article I1 alleged that in trying Callender, Chase was 
"prompted by a similar spirit of persecution and inj~stice."'~~ 
"Prompted by a similar spirit of persecution" seems quite clear- 
ly to refer to a spirit that antedated the trial. Presumably that 
was the Senate's understanding, for it admitted the oral testi- 
mony of preexisting bias. Are we to  assume that Chase's galaxy 
of counsel and the Senate unthinkingly admitted damaging 
144. Id. at 78-86. 
145. 1 WARREN, supra note 22, at 273. See also supra note 135. 
146. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 83. 
147. Id. at 82. 
148. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 8, 1 Stat. 76 (1789) (emphasis added). See also 
supra text accompanying note 138. 
149. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 108. 
150. Id. at 84. 
151. 3 STATE TRIALS 1283, 1287-88 (T.B. Howell ed., 1816). 
152. REHNQUIST, supm note 56, at 86. 
153. Supra text accompanying notes 47-50. 
154. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 86. 
155. Id. at 86-87. 
156. Id. at 86. 
157. 14 ANNAIS OF CONG. 86 (1852). 
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evidence of which the pleadings gave no notice? Moreover, that 
testimony serves to explain why, as article IV, paragraph 5 
charges, Chase's conduct of the trial was marked by "an inde- 
cent solicitude . . . for the conviction of the accused."'58 It fur- 
nishes the motivation for Chase's "extraordinary" rulings, his 
"partisan attitude" throughout the trial. Motivation, if memory 
serves me, need not be pleaded. In any event, we are not re- 
trying Chase, but asking, in light of uncontroverted facts, what 
should be the verdict of history? In this, we follow in the foot- 
steps of the Court; for, as Chief Justice Rehnquist reminds us, 
in 1964 the Court opined that the Sedition Act of 1798 "did 
violate the First Amendment."'59 
Lastly, Rehnquist observes that no law required a "federal 
judge to disqualify himself on account of bias."'" That, how- 
ever, did not absolve Chase from conducting the Callender trial 
in impartial fashion?' The Supreme Court declared that "a 
fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due proc- 
ess."'" Judicial impartiality, Thomas Hobbes observed, is "a 
law of nature."'" Hamilton put it simply: ''[Who would be 
willing to  stake his life and estate upon the verdict of a jury 
acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his 
g ~ i l t . " ' ~  English judges, Justice Story declared, had been im- 
peached "for acting grossly contrary to  the duties of their of- 
f i~e . " '~~  For me, as for Blackstone, "tyrannical partiality of 
judges" is a "crime of deep malignity."lB6 
The impeachment failed narrowly, Presser notes, not for 
lack of evidence, but, in great part, because the prosecution 
was led by the "ineffective and disorganized" John 
Rand~lph.'~' "A worse champion than Randolph for a difficult 
158. Id. 
159. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 89 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254 (1964)). 
160. REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 87. 
161. Rehnquist observes that Chase "should have refrained from making the 
statements attributed to him." Id. at 88. 
162. In re Murchison, 349 US. 133, 136 (1955). See also supra text accompany- 
ing notes 21-22. 
163. HOBBES, supra note 52,  at 80. 
164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added) 
(Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1961). See also supra text accompanying note 52. 
165. 1 STORY, supra note 140. See also supra text accompanying note 140. 
166. 4 B L A C ~ N E ,  supm note 53, at 140. See also supm text accompanying 
note 53. 
167. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 156. 
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cause," wrote Henry Adams, "could not be imagined.'y168 
Moreover, he had alienated his fellow Republicans by his sav- 
age attack a on the Administration's compromise of the Yazoo 
Indian Territory Land Fraud, "with a ferocity all but insane in  
its violen~e."'~~ As a result, enough disaffected Republicans 
voted with the Federalist bloc to block the conviction by a nar- 
row margin. The acquittal, my own detailed study of the im- 
peachment proceedings convinces me, represents a failure of 
justice. These facts call for detailed rebuttal; the facts are not 
to be dismissed as the views of "Jefferson and his partisans," 
nor as a mere ebullition of Republican politics. I t  was the Fed- 
eralists who played politics: "The Federalist senators, sitting as  
jurors, had caucused on their vote against conviction before the 
trial began."'70 
Where Chase maintained that his acts, though "improper" 
were not defined as a crime, Presser urges that they "violated 
no law."17' Since he follows in Chase's footsteps, inferably 
Presser too insists that, lacking an indictable crime, there is no 
basis for impeachment. The historical sources to the contrary 
are marshalled e l se~here ."~  Here i t  must suflCice to note that  
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the Constitution provides that  
"Ljludgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office . . . but the Party convicted shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judg- 
ment and Punishment ."'73 "Removal from ofice" is customari- 
ly not regarded as "punishment" for a crime; punishment is  
generally limited to fines and imprisonment. Moreover, "pun- 
ishment" is made the subject of a separate, undeniable criminal 
proceeding. If, therefore, removal be regarded as criminal, it 
would run afoul of the Fifth Amendment's ban of double jeopar- 
dy. Then too, since there is no federal common law of 
cri~nes,"~ the impeachment provision, as Justice Story point- 
ed out, would be a "nullity" until Congress specified what con- 
168. 2 ADAMS, supra note 60, at 151. 
169. 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note 44, at 174. Randolph's acts "in connection with 
the settlement of the Yazoo [Indian Land] Fraud claims had antagonized a consid- 
erable number of the members of his own party." REHNQUIST, supm note 56, at 
110. For a discussion regarding Randolph's actions in connection with the Yazoo 
fraud, see 3 BEVERIDGE, supra note. 44, at 575-79. 
170. BOWERS, supm note 36, at 280. 
171. Presser, supra note 4, at 1489; see also supm text accompanying note 135. 
172. See Berger, supm note 141, at 53-102. 
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added). 
174. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
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stitutes impeachable conduct.'75 No Congress has essayed t o  
define or codify impeachable acts. In employing the English 
terms "high crimes and misdemeanors," the Framers adopted 
the meaning given to them by English practice.'76 
IV. THE MIDNIGHT JUDGES 
Presser asserts that Berger is "himself consumed by parti- 
sanship when he attempts to defend the Jeffersonian sacking of 
the 'midnight judges.' "'17 After being overwhelmingly swept 
from office by the Jeffersonian victors in 1800, the lame-duck 
Federalist-dominated Congress. created twenty-odd judgeships, 
and "[alt the last hour," Adams "appointed sixteen Federalists 
to the new circuit [court]  judgeship^."'^^ Let a respected his- 
torian, Merrill Peterson, hopefully not "consumed by partisan- 
ship," describe the events: 
On March 3 the Senate was in session late into the night 
confirming a last batch of nominations, and Adams spent his 
final hours in the executive chair hurriedly signing nocturnal 
commissions. The indecency of the proceeding capped two 
crowded months of Federalist office-packing. What was this 
for unless to stack the cards against the new regime?'" 
Presser blandly replies, "there is nothing untoward about 
appointing judges whenever the President has a vacancy to  
fill."180 But here, numerous "vacancies'' were created at the 
last minute to saddle Federalist judges on the incoming admin- 
istration. Presser recognizes that "most American historians" 
regard the Judiciary Act of 1801 
as a blatant attempt to entrench the Federalists on the bench 
before Adams's term ended, thus to secure the one branch of 
the national government not yet lost to the Federalists. This 
175. 1 STORY, supra note 140, 8 798. 
176. Since "high crimes and misdemeanors* are not defined by a federal statute, 
said Story, resort "must be had either to parliamentary practice and the common 
law . . . or the whole subject must be left to the arbitrary discretion of the Sen- 
ate." 1 STORY, supra note 140, @ 796, 798. See also United States v. Smith, 18 
US. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820). 
177. Presser, supra note 4, at  1484. 
178. Leonard W. Levy, Jzdiciary Act of 1801, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERI- 
CAN CONSTITUTION 1077 (1986). 
179. PETERSON, supra note 28, at 668. The proceedings were "a blatantly parti- 
san measure designed, in part, to make the judiciary a fortress against the rising 
Republicanism of the nation." Id. at  631. 
180. Presser, supra note 4, at  1484. 
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motive on the part of the Federalists seems clear, but often 
lost sight of is the fact that the Federalists were equally moti- 
vated by the need to create several badly needed reforms in 
the judiciary which would have made the delivery of federal 
justice more comprehensive and more c~nvenient.'~' 
. 
"Needed reforms" was merely a facade for the "stacked 
Understandably, Jefferson moved to repeal the Judiciary 
Act which created the judgeships. Presser labels the repeal as 
blatantly "uncon~titutional."~'~ The power of one legislature 
t o  repeal an Act of its predecessors is rooted in the common 
law? Furthermore, Article I11 of the Constitution gives Con- 
gress power to establish inferior courts;'" the power to estab- 
lish carries with it the power to abolish. Against this, Presser 
urges that judges may be removed from office only by impeach- 
ment.'86 But the right to tenure cannot limit Congress's pow- 
er to disestablish a court. Tenure was not designed to compel 
continuance of a useless court until the death of the incumbent. 
A judge may have a right to continuance of salary but not to 
the performance of functions no longer needed. This is not a 
case-Presser's horrible example-of a congressional attempt to 
circumvent the impeachment process by abolishing the office of 
a particular judge,''? but an honest effort to undo a flagrant 
181. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  5. "Gouverneur Morris explained that the act was 
necessary because the Federalists were 'about to experience a heavy gale of ad- 
verse wind; can they be blamed for casting many anchors to hold their ship 
through the storm.' " REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 50 (quoting RICHARD E. ELLIS, 
THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 15 
(1971)). 
182. The Republicans "regarded it, with considerable justification, as a piece of polit- 
ical chicanery." REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at  50. "The Sedition Act of 1798 was 
rightly thought by the Jeffersonians to have been used on occasion as a means of 
silencing hostile criticism of the administration by the opposition press." Id. a t  275- 
76. 
Merrill Peterson considers that "the figures showed clearly that the dockets 
were not so crowded as to warrant an expensive addition to the system." PETER- 
SON, supra note 28, at  696. The Federalist Wolcott let the cat out of the bag: 
"there is no way to combat the state opposition but by an efficient and extended 
organization of judges, magistrates, and other civil officers." Id. at  631. 
183. Presser, supra note 1, at 157. In 1803, the "Supreme Court-consisting en- 
tirely of Federalist appointees-upheld the constitutionality of the repeal[er]." 
REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 52. 
184. See Presser, supra note 4, at  1485. 
185. U.S. CONST. art. 111, $ 1. 
186. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1485-86. 
187. Id. 
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attempt on a wholesale scale by a defeated party to perpetuate 
its control of the judiciary. 
Presser recognizes that "Chase could convince no other 
Supreme Court Justice to challenge the Jeffersonians on their 
view of the repealability of j udge~hips."'~~ Marshall, he 
states, failed t o  "acknowledge the blatant unconstitutionality of 
the Jeffersonian-controlled- federal legislature's repeal of the 
1801 Judiciary Act [enacted by a Federalist 'controlled 
Congress']," and "to protest against the Jeffersonian's sacking 
of the Federalist 'midnight judges.' "I8' To Presser, this ap- 
pears to be a "shirking of the responsibility for fidelity to the 
Constitution on the part of the judiciary."1g0 Those Justices 
were not, however, "consumed by [Jeffersonian] partisanship"; 
and it would appear that it is Presser that is the partisan, 
seeing "blatant unconstitutionality" which was hidden from the 
Justices. 
For his views on original intention, Presser relies on Jeffer- 
son Powell's "brilliant article"lgl without examining my thor- 
ough-going refutation of Powell.'" Powell published his arti- 
cle when he was but three years out of law school. A practiced 
historian knows, as Harold Laski wrote to Justice Holmes, that 
there is a hierarchy of authority.lg3 The studies of a veteran 
of sixty years of publication, whom Presser himself describes as 
"a renowned scholar,"194 are not lightly to be dismissed on the ' 
word of a fledgling. Original intention is at the heart of the 
current debate regarding the role of the Supreme Court, so its 
188. Id. at  1486. Richard Ellis stated that "Chase vigorously campaigned behind 
the scenes for the Supreme Court to declare the repeal law unconstitutional, but 
the other Justices did not go along with him." Richard Ellis, Samuel Chuse, in 1 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 293 (1986). See also Berger, supra 
note 2, at 887 n.107. 
189. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  163. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. a t  6 (citing H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985)). 
192. Raoul Berger, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 296 (1986); Raoul Berger, m e  Founders' Views-According to Jefferson Powell, 
67 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1055-77 (1989). 
193. 2 HOLMES-LASKI L-R~ 1463 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). Albert Jay Nock 
alludes to the "great peril . . . [of] the inability to appraise and grade one's au- 
thorities, the tendency to accept whatever appears on the printed page as authori- 
tative." NOCK, supra note 23, at 287. 
194. Presser, supra note 4, at  1475. 
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history deserved Presser's independent canvass. Instead, he 
finds that Powell is "correct,"195 and dismisses my refutation 
because the "legal academy" awards the palm to Powell,'g6 of 
which more later. 
Although Powell recognizes that the English common 
lawyers' references to "intention" often "sounded remarkably 
like contemporary intenti~nalists,"'~~ he maintains that they 
looked for the intent exclusively in the words themselves-a 
confessedly "curious u~age"'~~-this despite their constant dif- 
ferentiation between words and intention. Powell is confuted by 
the common law. For the benefit of the readers who will not 
scurry t o  the library to  determine for themselves wherein lies 
the truth, let me set forth a few highlights. 
(1) The fifteenth century sage, Chief Justice Frowyck, re- 
counted that the judges demanded of the "makers" of the Stat- 
ute of Westminster (1285) what certain words meaxit, and they 
"answered." "And so," he continued, "in our dayes have those 
that were the penners & devisors of statutes bene the grettest 
lighte for exposicion of statutes."1ss 
(2) Lord Chancellor Hatton wrote circa 1587 that "whenso- 
ever there is departure from the words to the intent, that must 
be well proved that there is such a meaning."200 
(3) Matthew Bacon epitomized such precedents in his New 
Abridgment: "Everything which is within the Intention of the 
Makers of a statute is, although it is not written in the Letter 
thereof, as much within the Statute as that which is within the 
Letter."201 
(4) Samuel Thorne, a leading legal historian, concluded 
that "[alctual intent . . . is controlling from Hengham's day to  
195. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 243 11.45. 
196. Presser, supra note 4, at  1493-94. Reviewing my Government by Judiciary, 
Lord Beloff, an Oxford emeritus and long-time student of American constitutional 
law, concurred, saying, "The quite extraordinary contortions that have gone into 
proving the contrary make sad reading for those impressed by the high quality of 
American legal historical scholarship." Max Beloff, Book Review, THE TIMES (Lon- 
don), April 7, 1978, (Higher Education Supplement), at 11. 
197. H. Jefferson Powell, 17te Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1533 (1987). 
198. Id. 
199. A DISCOURSE UPON THE EXPOSICION & UNDERSTANDING OF STATUTES 151-52 
(Samuel Thorne ed., 1942) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DISCOURSE]. 
200. CHRI~OPHER HAITON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES OF ACTS OF PAR- 
LIAMENT: AND THE EXPOSIT~ON THEREOF 14-15 (1677) (emphasis added). 
201. 4 MAWHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 647-48 (3d ed. 1768). 
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that of Lord Nottingham [1678] . '~~~ 
This rule represents sound common sense, reflected in the 
statement of John Selden, a preeminent seventeenth-century 
scholar: "[A] Man's Writing has but one true sense, which is 
that  which the Author meant when he writ it."'03 Who can 
better explain what was meant than the writer himself? Nei- 
ther Powell nor Presser comment on these and other similar 
materials that were spread before them. 
Instead, Presser rests on the "conclusions of the legal acad- 
emy," citing a recent article by Hans Baade,204 which merits 
attention if only because it betrays the sorry state of activist 
historical endeavors. Baade unearthed an  English copyright 
case from 1769,'05 wherein one of four judges-in one 
sentence-rejected recourse to legislative history, this being, 
Baade affirms, the rule "first articulated in Millar v. 
Taylor,"206 thus confirming that prior thereto the common law 
was to the contrary. Shortly thereaRer the House of Lords 
rejected the copyright views expressed in Millar, without tak- 
ing notice of Justice Willes' "legislative history" remark. 
For his opinion that the Millar view prevailed in the Unit- 
ed States, Baade invokes an  assumption of counsel in Wheaton 
v. Peters207 that Millar was known to the  framer^.^" Cer- 
tainly the Wheaton court did not assume that Millar was part 
of the "corpus of the common law of the United  state^.'"'^ 
The Court stated that "there can be no common law of the 
United States," and found that no such copyright doctrine ob- 
tained in Pennsylvania, "the state in which the controversy 
originat ed.7'210 
Baade is not the first to attack my views. Richard Saphire 
wrote in  1983 that refuting Berger "has become somewhat of a 
cottage ind~s t ry , '~"  and the stream of "refutations" flows un- 
202. DISCOURSE, supra note 199, at  126. 
203. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN, ESQ. 
10 (2d ed. 1696). 
204. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1493 11.94 (citing Hans W. Baade, "Original In- 
tent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991)). 
205. Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1769). 
2 .  Baade, supra note 204, a t  1108. 
207. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
208. Baade, supra note 204, at  1009. 
209. Id. 
210. Wheaton, 33 US. (8 Pet.) at  658. All this and much more is documented in 
a forthcoming article in the Texas Law Review. Raoul Berger, Original Intent: A Re- 
sponse to Hans Baade, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (1992). 
211. Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 
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abated. But the corpse will not stay buried. As Eric Foner 
wrote in a similar situation, the fact that "a generation of - 
scholars has directed its energies to overturning" my thesis 
indicates that it is to be taken seri~usly.~" Presser, who criti- 
cizes my resort to a secondary source, who "undoubtedly" suc- 
cumbed to "Jeffersonian propaganda2'-Samuel Eliot 
M~r ison ,~ '~  that soft-touch-"uncritically" embraces his own 
secondary sources, and what sources-Powell and Baade! 
Presser off-handedly refers to "the frequently discredited 
idea of turning back the clock,'n14 a phrase drawn from Chief 
Justice Earl Warren's opinion in Brown u. Board of 
~ducation~l~-Warren, who had no taste for digging in the 
library216-and from Paul Brest. Without doubt, Brest at- 
tempted to discredit' original intention; he it was who 
challenged the "assumption" that judges are "bound by the text 
or original understanding of the Constit~tion."~~' Under- 
standably for him there was no need to turn back the clock t o  
impede an imperial judiciary. Marshall, on the other hand, re- 
garded "intention as the most sacred rule of interpreta- 
ti~n."~l' 
The importance of original intention resides in the fact 
that ours is a government by consent of the governed, and as 
James Iredell said, the people choose "to be governed under 
such and such principles. They have not chosen to be governed 
or promised to submit upon any other."219 The postulates are 
cogently summarized by Richard Kay: 
To implement real limits on government the judges must 
have reference to standards that are external to, and prior to, 
8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 753 (1983). 
212. Eric Foner, The Slaveholder as Factory Owner, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1982, 
8 7 a t  27. 
213. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1481. 
214. PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  168. 
215. 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954). 
216. Fred Rodell of Yale rejoiced that Warren was not a "look-it-up-in-the-li- 
brary" intellectual in his "off-hand dismissal of legal and historical research." Fred 
Rodell, It Is the Warren Court, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 1966, 8 6 (Magazine) a t  30. 
Warren preferred his Einsteinean formula: "Is it  Fair?" See id. 
217. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. 
L. REV. 204, 224 (1980) (emphasis added). See Raoul Berger, Paul Brest's Brief for 
an  Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1 (1981). 
218. JOHN MARSHALL, DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 167 (Gerald 
Gunther ed., 1969). 
219. 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (Griffith J. McRee ed., 
1858). 
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the matter to be decided. This is necessarily historical investi- 
gation. The content of those standards are set at their incep- 
tion. Recourse to the intention of the framers in judicial re- 
view, therefore, can be understood as indispensable to realiz- 
ing the idea of government limited by law.220 
Lastly, the Founders adopted the Constitution on the basis 
of representations that its words did not entail certain feared 
consequences; they voted for the text as explained to obviate 
those fears. To repudiate such representations, said Justice 
Story in similar context, would constitute a fraud upon the 
people.221 
A. Calder v. Bull 
Apparently, Presser attaches considerable importance to 
Chase's statement made in one of four seriatim opinions in 
Calder v. ~ ~ 1 1 : ~ ~  "[A] strong statement that there were cer- 
tain unwritten 'vital' or 'fundamental' principles which circum- 
scribed the activities of both state and federal  legislature^."^^ 
These "supraconstitutiona1 principles"224 sounded like "natu- 
ral law" jurisprudence.225 They were immediately rejected by 
Justice Iredell: "[Tlhe Court cannot pronounce [an Act] to be 
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the 
principles of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are 
regulated by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men 
have differed upon the 
More importantly, the Constitution itself provides that it 
"shall be the supreme law of the land"; it leaves no room for a 
supersupreme law. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in 
Marbury u. m ad is on:'^ a written Constitution was designed 
to define and limit the delegated powers.228 That signdies, 
220. Richard Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN. L. REV. 801, 805-06 (1978). 
221. "If the Constitution was ratified under the belief, sedulously propagated . . . 
that such protection was afforded, would it not now be a fraud upon the whole 
people to give a different construction to its powers?" 1 STO*, supra note 140, 
8 1084. 
222. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
223. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 87. 
224. Id. at 42. 
225. Id. at 88. 
226. Calder, 3 U.S. at 399. 
227. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
228. Id. at 176. 
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Philip Kurland points out, that "government is the creature of 
the Constitution and cannot do what it does not authorize."229 
Such considerations applied with special force to judges, for 
Americans had a "profound fear of judicial di~cretion,'"~' 
which was intensified by the Puritans' fear of judicial warping 
of the law by "twisted constr~ction."~~' 
When called upon to adopt a federal common law of crimes 
in United States u. W ~ r r a l l , ~ ~ ~  Chase declared, "the constitu- 
tion of the Union is the source of all the jurisdiction of the 
national government; so that the departments of the govern- 
ment can never assume any power, that is not expressly granted 
by that instrument."233 Although Calder appears to be incon- 
sistent with W ~ r r a l l , ~ ~ ~  Presser finds a "similarity in the 
principles" of these cases. In Worrall "respect for individual 
rights required" that the crime be first defined, while Calder 
asserted by way of illustration, that "no legislature could pass 
[an] ex post facto law[]" and the like.235 That is Presser's fine 
distinction;236 but throughout, Worrall emphasized the judi- 
cial lack of authority to draw jurisdiction outside the Constitu- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Before long the Supreme Court in United States u. Hud- 
229. PHILIP KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITU!~ION 7 (1978). Presser 
recounts that in 1804, Chase himself declared that "the judge [has] as his simple 
task the declaration of the law as it has been given to him in a written consti- 
tution or statute." PRESSER, supra note 3, a t  185. 
230. GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, a t  
298 (1969). 
231. See Berger, supra note 2, at 892-93. 
232. 28 F. Cas. 774 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766). 
233. Id. at 779 (emphasis added). 
234. See Presser, supra note 4, at 1480. This is viewed by Presser as illustrative 
"of the complexity and multileveled nature of early American federal jurispru- 
dence." PRESSER, supra note 3, at 177. He explains that Chase et al. drew from 
"complex and competing ideologies" which "often led them to take inconsistent 
political or legal positions." Id. at 45. This is an elegant way of saying that he 
played both sides of the street, choosing conflicting doctrines as suited the occasion. 
235. Presser, supra note 4, at 1480. This was gratuitous because Article I, Sec- 
tion 9, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides that "no ex post facto law shall be 
passed." See also U.S. C o ~ s r .  art I, 5 10, cl. 1. 
236. Referring to a "sophisticated argument," Presser opines that it is "difficult 
to believe that such a refined analysis would have appealed to many late eigh- 
teenth century minds." PRESSER, supra note 3, at 88. See also id. at 218 11.41, 219 
11.61. 
237. In Worrall, Chase stated, "[A111 the judicial authority of the federal courts, 
must be derived, either from the constitution of the United States, or from the 
acts of congress made in pursuance of that constitution." 28 F. Cas. at 776. And 
he said, "[C]ommon law authority, relating to crime and punishments, has not been 
conferred upon the government of the United States, which is a government in 
other respects also of a limited jurisdiction." Id. at  779. 
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son & G~odwin~~'  rejected common law crimes and confirmed 
that when the operations of a court are "confined to certain 
specific objects," it may not assume a 'huch more extended" jurisdic- 
tion "applicable to a great variety of subjects."239 The fact is 
that Chase "switch[ed] back and forth," from natural law to 
instrumentalism, regarding "styles of judicial reasoning [as] 
simply political tools.'"40 
For his view that the law of nature was incorporated in 
American law, Presser avouches James Wilson who, starting 
with the proposition that the law of nations was part of Ameri- 
can law, concluded that "[tlhe law of nations was 'the law of 
nature.' 'a41 By that logic, Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 lim- 
its access t o  the "law of nature"; it  authorizes Congress "[tlo de- 
fine . . . Offences against the Law of Nations."242 The genesis 
of this provision is instructive. Initially i t  was proposed to con- 
fer jurisdiction on the Court in cases concerning the law of na- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  This unrestricted grant was changed so that Con- 
gress could "declare the Law and Punishment . . . of Offences 
against the Law of  nation^."^^ Madison observed that "no 
foreign law should be a standard farther than is expressly 
adopted."245 Ultimately, Congress was empowered to "define" 
such offenses.246 Gouverneur Morris explained that this was 
necessary because "the law of [nations] [was] often too vague 
and deficient to be a rule."247 
Therefore, unless Congress defines such offences against 
the law of nations to include the law of nature, natural law has 
no application in that context. And unless an offense against 
the law of nations is involved, Congress, by necessary implica- 
tion, has no authority to legislate in the premises. 
B. Deference and Democracy 
No doubt "the excesses of the French Revolution convinced 
Chase and his fellows that democracy had to be tempered with 
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
Id. at 33. 
PRESSER, supra note 3, at 166. 
Id. at 71. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 10 (emphasis added). 
2 RECORDS, supra note 36, at 136. 
Id. at 168. 
Id. at 316. 
Id. at 570, 614. 
Id. at 615. 
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legislative, judicial and constitutional  restraint^."^" But the 
issues are whether the Framers contemplated the restraints 
and whether the Constitution authorized judges to fashion 
them. Chase was sailing in the teeth of a democratic storm that 
before long blew the Federalists out of office. He was, I earlier 
wrote, "utterly insensitive t o  the democratic tide that was lap- 
ping at his feet even as he labored."24g It is no answer that he 
had, in his "personal odyssey," arrived at "a mature set of be- 
liefs based on English conservative political and judicial princi- 
p l e ~ , ' ' ~ ~ ~  including belief in "a structured society, the inevita- 
bility of different social classes, and the subordination of the 
lower orders to  the After casting their votes, the 
people, "according to the Federalist judges[,] . . . were hence- 
forth to refrain from harmful criticism of their properly consti- 
tuted officials and were to obey them unq~estioningly.'"~~ 
Such notions were completely out of tune with the nascent 
democratic forces, who had before them the Founders' harsh 
criticisms of George 111. 
Consider Chase's charge t o  a Baltimore jury, criticizing the 
change in the Maryland Constitution extending suffrage as 
signifying that "our republican constitution will sink into a 
mobocracy."2s3 He animadverted upon the "late[r] reformers' " 
doctrine that all men "are entitled to enjoy equal liberty and 
equal rights" as a "mighty mi~chief,"~" never mind the affw- 
mation in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are 
created equal."2ss Presser cites Wilson's alleged belief in a 
248. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  179 11.13. 
249. Berger, supra note 2, at  876, quoted in Presser, supra note 4, a t  1479. 
250. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1479. 
251. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 18. The English conservatives' "world of defer- 
ence" contemplated "hierarchical control, and a single set of correct answers to 
political problems . . . to be elaborated and pronounced from top down. Sovereignty 
in England . . . rested not in the people but in the 'holy trinity' of crown, lords, 
and commons." Id. at 51. Those views were shared by Alexander Hamilton, who 
stated in the Federal Convention that communities are divided into "the rich and 
well born, the other the mass of the people. . . . Nothing but a permanent body 
can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrollable disposi- 
tion requires checks." 1 RECORDS, supra note 36, a t  299. John Jay forthrightly de- 
clared that "those who own the country should govern the country." NOCK, supra 
note 23, a t  216. Small wonder that Americans were attracted rather by the views 
of English "radical intellectuals." WOOD, supra note 230, at  15. 
252. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  17. 
253. BOWERS, supra note 36, a t  274. 
254. Id. 
255. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
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"limited but it was not embraced by Chase's 
own state, Maryland. Wilson wrote: 
This darling privilege of freemen should certainly be extended 
a s  far as considerations of safety and order will possibly per- 
mit. The correct theory and the true principles of safety re- 
quire, that every citizen whose circumstances do not render 
him necessarily dependent on the will of another [e.g. a slave] 
should possess a vote.257 
In  the Federal Convention Pierce Butler said, "[tlhere is no 
right of which the people are more jealous than that of suf- 
frage."258 He was joined by others.259 
Chase's idea of "enlightened judicial leadership," says 
Presser, led him "to. seek to implement restrictions on legisla- 
tures through the 'supra-constitutional principles' found in 
Calder u. ~u1Z"~~~-principles that ran counter to the limited 
delegations of the Constitution. As Wilson flatly stated in the 
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, "the supreme power . . . 
resides in the PEOPLE . . . they can distribute it" as they 
They did not empower judges to insulate themselves 
from criticism or to apply "supra-constitutional principles." 
Those in whom the "supreme power resides" have no need to 
defer to agents to whom they delegated limited power. And as I 
earlier wrote, "The very idea of 'deference' . . . was repugnant 
to . . . self-reliant Ameri~an[s] ."~~~ It  was to escape from such 
class-ridden notions that they braved the ocean. 
VI. THOMAS JEFFERSON 
Presser charges that Jefferson was a "demagogue," which 
his dictionary defmes as a "leader who obtains power by means 
of impassioned appeals to the emotions and prejudices of the 
p ~ p u l a c e . " ~ ~  The Oxford English Dictionary adds "an unprin- 
256. Presser, supra note 4, at  1479 n.10. 
257. 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 84, at  406-07. 
258. RECORDS, supra note 36, at .202. 
259. Id. at  201-03. Jefferson's "unhesitating advocacy of a broadly [based] popu- 
lar suffrage and of equal representation of the people in the legislature held the 
promise of making his constitution a vital instrument of democratic government." 
PETERSON, supra note 28, at 105-06. 
260. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1479. 
261. PENNSYLVANIA HISF. SOC'Y, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
1787-1788, at  316 (John B. McMaster & Fredrick D. Stone eds., 1888). 
262. Berger, supra note 2, at  874. 
263. Presser, supra note 4, at 1490 11.76 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
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cipled or factious popular orator."2* Since oratory is the me- 
dium of demagogy, and since Jefferson was no o r a t 0 3 ~ ~  and 
delivered no orations, Presser is driven to argue that the "im- 
passioned appeals" were made by proxy, by "partisan scrib- 
blers.'"" All credit to Presser for suggesting demagogy by 
proxy. Federalist "scribblers" waged a massive campaign of 
~ilification,~~' so by Presser's test, the Federalists were a par- 
ty of demagogues. 
Whatever Adams' reaction in the heat of political 
strife,268 his mature judgment expressed in his old age to 
Jefferson was, "your administration will be quoted by philoso- 
DICTIONARY 379 (2d College ed. 1985)). Presser invokes Justice Story's charge that 
Jefferson was a demagogue, "the evil-minded genius behind the spreading disinte- 
gration of the country." Id. at  1489 11.72 (quoting JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH 
STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 119 (197 1)). Powell, whose authority 
Presser prefers to mine, wrote that according to the consensus, Story was "an 
opponent of 'democracy' intent on frustrating the results of the political process" by 
"the creation of a body of 'anti-majoritarian' constitutional law." H. Jefferson 
Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 
YALE L.J. 1285, 1287 (1985). Story's Commentaries, Powell observes, "were a 
massive self-vindication . . . as well as an indictment of the man Story personally 
despisedn-Thomas Jefferson. Id. at  1300 n.103. 
Jefferson " s h u ~ e d  popularity," and was "self-effacing." PETERSON, supra note 
28, at  334. Abigail Adams, who along with John, had long enjoyed close friendship 
with Jefferson, wrote, "He is one of the choice ones of the earth." Id. at 302. 
Another long-time friend, Lafayette, who was in close contad with him during his 
five-year stay in France, wrote to a friend in America, "He is everything that is 
good, upright, enlightened and clever, and is respected and beloved by every one 
that knows him." Id. at 316. The very antithesis of a "crafty politician." John 
Quincy Adams, who came into Congress in 1803, said, "You can never be an hour 
in this man's company without something of the marvelous." Id. at  727. "Lincoln 
was unstinting in his admiration for Jefferson." GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYS- 
BURG 85 (1992). 
264. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1727 (1969). 
265. PETERSON, supra note 28, at 655. Peterson noted his "deficiencies as a 
speaker." Id. at 21. In fad, Jefferson "shrank from the impassioned political 
bitterness that raged around him." 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 992 (14th ed. 
1929). He "was not, in his nature, born for the public . . . . He held back, be- 
grudging commitment to the public role." PETERSON, supra note 28, at 30. In 1792, 
"Jefferson found himself brought forward-less by his friends than by his 
enemies-as the 'generalissimo' of a political party on which he meant to mount 
his own ambition a t  the hazard of government itself . . . . It was not a role he 
coveted." Id. at  466. He "became a candidate for the presidency . . . in spite of 
himself. He did not seek the office but the office sought him." Id. at  543; see also 
id. at 552. In the election of 1796, he wrote Madison that "should [Jefferson] and 
Adams end in a tie, he wished the chance to go to the New Englander." Id. at  
557. See also NOCK, supra note 23, at  261. 
266. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1490 n.74. 
267. PADOVER, supra note 23, a t  116, 143; see also supra note 23. 
268. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1490 11.74. 
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phers as a model of profound wisdom."269 That is not the ear- 
mark of demagogy. Presser's view of Jefferson as a demagogue, 
i.e. "unprincipled," is not shared by American historians. "The 
secret of his power," Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, "lay in the 
fact that he appealed to and expressed America's idealism, 
simplicity, and hopeful outlook,"270 a far remove from dema- 
gogy. I t  is needless to recapitulate the documented particu- 
lars of my defense of Jefferson against Presser's charges.271 
One who studies those materials is unlikely to conclude that 
Jefferson was "committed to a philosophy that the end justifies 
the means [e.g. the Louisiana Purchase]," or that he often "ig- 
nor[ed] . . . the rule of law,"272 whereas Chase "put the rule of 
law a t  the center of his politics," this of the "American 
Jeffreys."273 Presser's comparison of Jefferson's "departure 
from the e.g. the Louisiana Purchase, which Congress 
all but forced on him,275 with Richard Nixon's coverup of the 
Watergate break-in, speaks for itself.276 Nor did I "praise Jeffer- 
269. 2 PAGE SMITH, JOHN ADAMS 1111 (1962). Adams said, "Mr. Jefferson and I 
have grown old and retired from public life. So we are upon our ancient terms of 
good will." Id. at 1113. 
270. MORISON, supra note 38, a t  359. "Jefferson, because he had a thorough 
trust and confidence in the people, became the idol of American democracy." 12 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BR~ANNICA 989 (14th ed. 1929). 
271. Berger, supra note 2, at  892-902. 
272. Presser, supra note 4, at  1492. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Berger, supra note 2, at 895-96. Madison later wrote, "The public interest, 
the necessity of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their consti- 
tutional limits." PETERSON, supra note 28, at  280. Rehnquist recounts: 
At first Jefferson himself drew up drafts of an amendment to the Con- 
stitution which would authorize the acquisition of Louisiana, but then 
word came . . . that Napoleon was having seller's remorse about the 
transaction and would seize upon any reason to avoid it. Jefferson then 
urged his supporters in Congress to ratify the purchase. 
REHNQUIST, supra note 56, at 56. 
276. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1492. Another far-fetched Presser analogy takes 
off from Jefferson's comment after the 1792 "massacres" in France: "For such a 
cause, Jefferson explained, 'I would have seen half the earth desolated.' " PRESSER, 
supra note 3, at 153. This, Presser remarks, "strangely foreshadows the attitude of 
the American troops in South Vietnam, who piously destroyed villages in order to 
'save' them from the Viet Cong." Id. In Vietnam, the troops were invaders seeking 
to stifle a native democratic movement. In France, wrote Leonard Woolf, the 
Revolution "destroyed an ancient, malignant growth in European society, and this 
was essential for the future of European civilization." LEONARD WOOLF, BEGINNING 
AGAIN 215 (1964). The executions, a deplorable concomitant of revolutions, were a 
reaction to centuries of feudal oppression whereby the people meant to cast off the 
shackles of a despotic regime. Jefferson's sympathy with a suffering people's 
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son for his extra-legal actions,"277 which he himself sought to 
explain. To wrest from Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virgin- 
ia "a contempt for the common man" collides with the facts.278 
Nor did Chase and Jefferson have "in common . . . their beliefs 
in the need for some deference [i.e., subservience] in soci- 
ety.'7279 To the contrary, Jefferson had "faith in the wisdom of 
struggle, even when excessive, is not to be equated with the conduct of a soldiery 
ordered to impose the views of a misguided administration upon the Vietnamese. 
277. Presser, supra note 4, at 1492. Typical is Presser's renewed charge that 
Jefferson approved the "extra-legal means of apprehending Burr." Id. at 1491. 
Jefferson explained why General Wilkinson was justified in (1) "seizing [the] 
notorious conspirators," and (2) "sending them to the seat of government, when the 
written law gave them a right to trial in the territory." Berger, supra note 2, at  
897. This, Jefferson explained, was due to "[tlhe danger of their rescue, of their 
continuing machinations . . . . [Slalvation of the city, and of the Union itself . . . 
constituted a law of necessity and self preservation." WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFER- 
SON 1232-33 (Viking Press 1984) (1895-99). Contained in a private letter to a 
correspondent, it recalls Lincoln's later suspension of habeas corpus in Maryland 
because of the secessionists' threat to Washington. Such judgments have to be 
made on the scene. Poindexter, sent by Jefferson to report, proposed that Burr be 
sent to Washington so that the Supreme Court could determine the place of trial. 
BOWERS, supra note 36, at 393. In the circumstances, Jefferson's conduct did not 
display arbitrary disregard for the rule of law. 
278. Presser, supra note 4, at  1490. His arguments are discussed in Berger, 
supra note 2, at 898-901. 
Presser builds on Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia, published in 1785. 
PETERSON, supra note 28, at  153. There Jefferson, viewing vast pools of ignorance, 
proposed a sweeping educational program: three years of free schooling at the 
elementary level, followed by education at State expense of gifted people selected 
through a winnowing process. The fact that the well-to-do could continue their 
education at their own expense does not indicate that Jefferson was committed to 
keeping the common man in his place. The States were in dire financial straits 
and could not undertake free education at  all levels. 
In truth, Jefferson "knew absolutely no social distinctions," and had "an unlim- 
ited faith in the honesty of the people; a large faith in their common sense." 12 
ENCYCLOPEDLA BRITANNICA 991 (14th ed. 1929). He believed that talent was "scat- 
tered with equal hand through all" conditions of men. PE~ERSON, supra note 28, at 
114. In short, he believed in training a meritocracy drawn from all walks of life. 
While serving as minister to France, Jefferson concluded that the "immense majori- 
ty was in bondage to its masters." NOCK, supra note 23, at 88. 
His hatred of exploitation of the poor by the rich was unremitting. See PETER- 
SON, supra note 28, at 382, 350; Berger, supra note 2, at  899-900. At a time when 
suffrage was tied to property, he urged manhood suffrage. PETERSON, supra note 
28, at 282. 
279. Presser, supra note 4, at  1492. Throughout, Jefferson's sympathies were 
with the common man. Thus, he rejected Hamilton's schemes for funded debt and 
bank stock because they "would further enrich the privileged financial class a t  the 
expense of the mass of people." PM'ERsoN, supra note 28, at 460. "The aristocracy 
of England," Jefferson observed, "have the laws and government in their hands 
[and] have so managed them as to reduce the eleemosynary class or paupers, 
below the means of supporting life, even by labour." NOCK, supra note 23, at 104. 
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the masses";280 he advocated "the control of the people 
over. . . their government," and considered that the "mass of 
the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights."281 
Presser notes Jefferson's "faith in public opinion and in democ- 
racy generally," being "poles apart from Chase."282 This does 
not smack of "contempt for the common man." 
A word too about Presser's view that "Jefferson's notion of 
states' rights was . . . constitutionally untenable" and "ulti- 
mately led to our civil war.'a8s Presser refers to the Kentucky 
and Virginia Resolutions, which, like a too tightly coiled spring, 
recoiled from the "odious" Alien and Sedition Acts. And as the 
Encyclopedia Britannica remarks, "They are not to be judged 
by constitutional principles established later by courts and 
war."2" Lastly, the Britannica concludes that "the ideas [Jef- 
ferson] advocated have become the very foundation of American 
Republicanism. No other man's ideas have had anything like 
a n  equal influence upon the institutions of the country,'7285 
least of all Chase's. This is the answer to the issue Presser 
framed: "whether Jefferson or Chase better expressed noble 
ideals fit for American jur i spr~dence ."~~~ 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Presser "confess[es] to a degree of naivete and a romantic 
streak" in cherishing the ideal that "ours is a government of 
laws, not of men."" One need not be a Don Quixote to share 
that belief; law is indispensable to the maintenance of society. 
But a "bigoted Federalist bully"-so Chase is regarded by "ev- 
ery other legal historian"-is hardly the happiest exemplar of 
the reign of law. Even a Sancho Panza can perceive that the 
bully on the block is not the law's beau ideal. Presser's "project 
of making a noble stand for the rule of law . . . through reliance 
280. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  161. 
281. WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1394-95 (Viking Press 1984) (1895-99). He 
preferred the "majority opinion of the community" to that "of self-styled guardians 
of the public interest." PETERSON, supra note 28, at  703. 
282. PRESSER, supra note 3, at  154. 
283. Presser, supra note 4, at  1491-92. 
284. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 989 (14th ed. 1929). In 1803, some leading 
New England Federalists conspired to secede fmm the Union on the ground that 
the Louisiana Purchase absolved the original states from their allegiance. MORISON, 
supra note 38, a t  368. 
285. 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 989 (14th ed. 1929). 
286. Presser, supra note 4, a t  1490. 
287. Id. at 1477. 
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on Samuel Chase, the 'American Jeffreys,' is bizarre. It 
recalls an early German film, The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari, 
which had no horizontal or perpendicular lines; all were slant- 
ed in different directions, creating a disquieting disorientation. 
Nor did Chase "articulate and activate the moral aspira- 
tions of the American people,"289 then or now. His attachment 
t o  conservative English principles of deference and subservi- 
ence were at odds with the American commitment to the tenet 
"all men are created Presser failed to read defer- 
ential principles into the minds of the Founders, still less su- 
pervening "supra-cons titutional principles of government." 
Lastly, I dissent from the implications of his final remarks 
that we "argue[d] like lawyers . . . about who was 'right,' " and 
that "good lawyers do not necessarily make good histori- 
a n ~ . " ~ ~ '  It little matters whether Presser or Berger is "right," 
but it is the duty of a scholar to vindicate the truth. 
Nor am I prepared t o  admit that "good lawyers do not 
necessarily make good historians." Lawyers, to be sure, must 
espouse their client's cause, but they may not therefore impose 
upon the A lawyer is an officer of the court, under a 
duty of scrupulous candor. One who distorts or conceals the 
facts invites disaster and sows distrust in the minds of the 
judge. Like the historian, therefore, the lawyer had best re- 
count the facts honestly. Two eminent practitioners of the his- 
torical art, Hugh Trevor-Roper and C.R. Elton, agreed that the 
essence of "historical method" is to ground "detail upon evi- 
dence and generalizations upon details."293 That is the meth- 
288. Id. at 1478. 
289. Id. at 1477. 
290. It was English radicalism, not conservative "deferential" thinking that won 
American hearts. PRESSER, supra note 3, at 52, 207 n.31. See also WOOD, supra 
note 230, at 16-17. 
291. Presser, supra note 4, at  1495. 
292. "Like Berger," writes Presser, "I too have in me some unstoppable 
cussedness, some irresistible desire to fly against conventional wisdom." Id. at  
1478. "Speak for yourself, John." Sheer intellectual curiosity, not an "irresistible 
desire to fly against conventional wisdom," has launched me on my studies of 
impeachment, the fourteenth amendment, and federalism, etc. And I have ever 
bowed to the fads, however unpalatable the result. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Con- 
structive Contempt: A Post Mortem, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 602 (1942). 
Presser charged that I am "consumed by partisanship," Presser, supra note 4, 
at  1478, but he would be hard-pressed to finger the "partisan" source of my Chase 
studies. 
293. Hugh Trevor-Roper, Book Review of Elton, The Practice of History, THE 
TIMES (London), Oct. 15, 1967, at 33. 
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od both good lawyers and good historians employ-they draw 
rational conclusions from meticulously screened facts. Each 
must guard against imposing a theory upon recalcitrant facts; 
for each, Procrustes is a poor model. 
